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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

ROBERT DEAN,
CaseNo.20020180-CA
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals the restitution order of $577/75 imposed after his conviction for
automobile theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 76-6-404 (1999),
and unauthorized control of a vehicle for an extended time, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (Supp. 2001). This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2Xc) (Supp. 2001).
IgSVg f HESENTEP Of* A*> FEAi AM> STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue: Was the trial court within its discretion in ordering defendant to pay
$577.75 in restitution to the owner of a car damages by defendant's criminal conduct?
Standard of Review: A trial court's restitution order is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, f 6,992 P.2d 995.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RUT FS
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (1999), a copy of which is attached as
Addendum A, is dispositive in this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 1,2001, defendant was charged by information with two criminal
counts: second and third degree felony theft (R. 2). On November 29, 2001, pursuant to a
plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of automobile theft and one count of
unauthorized control of a vehicle for an extended time (joyriding), a class A misdemeanor
(R. 35-36).
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of one year and zero-to-five years in
the Utah State Prison (R. 35). Following a hearing, defendant was also ordered to pay
$577.75 in restitution to cover damage to the vehicle while it was under his control (R.
55,65:28).
Defendant timely appealed (R. 57).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Even though a functional vehicle became completely useless during a week in
defendant's care, he does not believe he owes the owner of the car any money (R. 8,22,
27).

1

'"On appeal, the facts are recited in a light most favorable to the [judge's
ruling].'" State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 79 (Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted).
2

The owner of the car, Donald Seth Johnson, believes otherwise, although he does
not claim to know how defendant destroyed the vehicle (R. 65:11). "All I know is, when
I got my car back, it didn't work'* (id.). Before defendant "borrowed" Johnson's car on
May 31, 2002, promising to return it the next day, the vehicle was functional, if not
entirely trouble-free. Johnson acknowledged that the vehicle, a Suburu GL 10, was a
1986 model, had been driven approximately 170,000 miles and that the starter sometimes
needed a little prompting with a hammer before the car would turn over (R. 65:9, 10).
Nonetheless, he had owned the car for a year and it "was in driving condition. I mean it
went forward. It stopped" (R. 7). He took the Suburu to work and drove itfromthe
Provo area to St. George and back with no mechanical problems (R. 64:5, 65:7,9,18).
When defendant did not return the vehicle as promised, Johnson reported it stolen
(R. 65:6). On June 5,2001, the abandoned Suburu was discovered at a car dealership in
Provo, where defendant had left it while he was supposedly taking a Nissan Altima for a
"test drive" (R. 64:5). Defendant drove the Altima to Mexico, where it was stolen (id.).
After recovering his carfromthe impound lot, Johnson immediately noticed a
difference. "[T]he acceleration was shot. There was a leak somewhere in the exhaust.
Just the feel of the car was different" (R. 65:16). Two days later, the car stopped running
(R. 65:8). Johnson took the car to a mechanic, who charged him $1,200.44 for parts and
labor (R. 62). Two weeks later, the transmission blew up and Johnson bought a new car
(R. 65:8-9).

3

Defendant stated he could not have caused any of the damage because he had
merely driven the car "around Provo," covering less than 100 miles (R. 65:22).
Moreover, according to defendant, "[t]here was a lot of [pre-existing] problems with that
car" (R. 65:20). However, the starter problem and worn out brake pads were the only
defects defendant could specifically recall that existed before he "borrowed" the car (id.).
At the conclusion of the restitution hearing, the trial court ruled that some of the
damage to the vehicle was attributable to defendant's criminal conduct and, therefore, he
should pay for some of the repairs (R. 65:27). By adding the sums Johnson spent for the
repairs and subtracting that amountfromthe total repair bill, the court concluded that
defendant should pay $577.75 in restitution (R. 65:28).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: The trial court's restitution order was carefully formulated and wellsupported by the record Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the
restitution order should be affirmed
Point II: Even if defendant could show that the record did not establish a direct
causal connection between defendant's admitted criminal conduct and Ithe damages to the
car, the trial court still acted appropriately because restitution can be imposed for
rehabilitative purposes. Accordingly, the trial court's restitution order should be
affirmed.

4

ARGUMENT
Admittedly, the vehicle defendant stole was not in vintage condition. It was a
1986 model, had been driven an estimated 170,000 and had some mechanical problems.
Nonetheless, it ran. After defendant had driven it for a week, it did not. In fact, after a
week in defendant's possession, the car had manifested numerous additional mechanical
problems which ultimately rendered it beyond repair. The trial court's restitution order
was well within its discretion and should not be disturbed by this court.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY
RESTITUTION.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay the costs of
repairing the damaged vehicle. Under Utah law,
[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal activity that has
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to another sentence
it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make
restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection,
or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make
restitution as part of a plea agreement.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4Xa)(i) (1999) (emphasis added). "Restitution" includes
"full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim,..." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-20l(lXd). "Pecuniary damages" means
all special damages, but not general damages, which a person
could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising
out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal
activities and includes the money equivalent of property
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses
including earnings and medical expenses.
5

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(c). Before restitution may be awarded, a trial court must
establish a "nexus" between the victim's pecuniary losses and the actions of the
defendant. See, e.g., State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273,fflf3-5, 987 P.2d 1289 (per
curiam).
A restitution order should be upheld unless the trial court's findings were an abuse
of discretion. Seet e.g., State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, f 6, 992 P.2d 995 (order
of restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,
887 (Utah 1978) ("Before this Court will overturn the sentence given by the trial court, it
must be clear that the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse
of discretion"). Moreover, "the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects
the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if
it can be said that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id.;
accord State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,128,27 P.3d 1133.
Restitution is proper even when a defendant's responsibility for the damage is
based on circumstantial evidence. Burke v. State, 410 S.E.2d 164,165 (Ga. App. 1991).
In Burke, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution for repairs to a vehicle which he
admitted stealing. Id. On appeal, the defendant claimed he could not be held accountable
for the damage to the vehicle because he had only admitted to stealing it, not damaging it.
Id. at 165. The appeals court disagreed, noting that the state's restitution statute allowed
recovery for "'all damages which a victim could recover against an offender in a civil

6

action . . . based on the same act or acts for which the offender is sentenced,..." Id.
(citation and emphasis omitted). The court reasoned that:
the owner testified that the car was in good condition when it
was stolen and that it was found abandoned in a ditch, in
damaged condition, the day after it was stolen. Appellant
admitted stealing the car. This evidence, although
concededly circumstantial, supports the conclusion that the
damage to the car was proximately caused by the unlawful act
for which appellant was sentenced, Le., appellant's theft of the
car... It follows that the trial court was authorized to order
appellant to pay restitution for the damage.
Id.
During the restitution hearing in this case, the trial court heard testimony from
defendant and Johnson, the former owner of the car. Johnson acknowledged that the car
had mechanical problems when he loaned it to defendant on June 2,2001. "Starter
sometimes would be a little on thefritz,but, I mean, it would start up. Just give it a
second and a tap with a hammer (R. 65:9). Otherwise, "[i]t was in driving condition. I
mean, it went forward It stopped" (R.65:7).
After recovering the car, Johnson immediately noticed additional problems.
"[T]he acceleration was shot- There was a leak somewhere in the exhaust. Just the feel
of the car was different" (R. 65:16). Two days later, the car stopped running (R. 65:8).
Johnson took the car to a mechanic, who made the following repairs:
1
1
4
1
1

Starter
Alternator
SparkPlugs
Wire Set
Distributor Cap

$110.21
124.94
17.36
25.70
3.50
7

2
1
1
1
1
Vz

Brake Pads
Rotors
Battery
Battery Terminals
Fuel Filter
CVAxle
Water Pump
Gallon Antifreeze

30.00
139.59
65.00
3.00
19.00
89.02
86.07
6.50

See copy of State's Exhibit No. 1 (receipt from Milt's Auto Repair & Muffler) (R. 62)
attached as Addendum B. The grand total for labor and parts was $1,200.44 (id.).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that defendant was
responsible for some of the damage and, accordingly, should pay for some of the repairs
(R. 65:27). The court found that defendant was not responsible for replacing the starter,
the alternator, the brake pads, the two rotors, the battery and cables or amy of the labor
associated with making those repairs (R. 65:28). The court subtracted the total for those
repairs - $622.69 - from the total of $1,200.44 and ordered defendant to pay the
remaining $577.75 as restitution.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay the
restitution because it is not the case that "no reasonable man would take the view adopted
by the trial court/5 Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. The court was careful to attribute to
defendant only those repairs that were "directly related to the timeframeof his use and
the amount of his use. The others that were excluded are not consistent with the
testimony that would require [defendant] to have to pay for those items" (R. 65:30).
Indeed, the court gave defendant the benefit of the doubt on replacement of the rotors, the
8

alternator and the battery and cables, even though defendant did not specifically deny
responsibility for those items. In short, the court's findings were well-founded, careful
and well within its discretion. The restitution order should not be disturbed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED
DEFENDANT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIM FOR
DAMAGES TO THE VEHICLE-

Defendant claims he should not have been ordered to pay restitution to the victim
because "the trial court abused its discretion in . . . arbitrarily ordering him to pay the
costs of repair on some of the car parts without first establishing a causal relationship
between his joyriding and the need to replace/repair these specific parts." Aplt. Br. at 7.
This claim is without merit.
As demonstrated in section I above, the trial court's decision was not arbitrary.
The court was careful to hold defendant responsible only for those repairs that could be
tied to his actions. However, even assuming that the State did not meet its burden in
showing defendant's theft and joyriding caused the damage to the car, the trial court's
order of restitution is still valid because compensating the victim of a crime is not the
only goal of restitution. It is within the discretion of the trial court to consider the
rehabilitative and deterrent effects of restitution upon the defendant. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-201(8XcXiii) and State v. Tmtchell, 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) ("[T]he
trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering rehabilitative and deterrent purposes
and ordering restitution ...").

9

Moreover, rehabilitative restitution need not be equal to the actual loss suffered by
the victim. For example, in Twitchell, this Court upheld court ordered restitution, even
though the victims suffered no out-of-pocket losses. There, defendant was an insurance
broker who told policy holders that their premium payments were being used to purchase
insurance coverage from legitimate, licensed insurance companies. Id. at 867. However,
defendant actually kept most of the premiums and processed damage claims himself. Id.
Fortunately, defendant was caught before any policy holders suffered losses. Id.
Nonetheless, the trial court ordered defendant to pay $447,762.34 in restitution - an
amount equal to the total premiums paid to the defendant, minus the amounts he either
forwarded to legitimate insurance companies or that he used to pay claims. Id. at 868.
On appeal, the defendant protested that restitution was improper where there were no
losses. This Court disagreed, noting:
"Restitution, in theory, may help rehabilitate the offender,
there is a strong feeling that if the offender is made to suffer a
loss and pay for the responsibility of the loss he caused, there
is a greater likelihood he'll not do it again."
Id. (quoting State v. Dillon, 637 P.2d 602,606-07 n. 6 (Or. 1981)).
Here, the trial court had no choice but to impose restitution; defendant was
convicted of criminal conduct that resulted in pecuniary damages. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-201(4)(a)(i) ("When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to another sentence it may impose, the court shall order
that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime ...") (emphasis added). Thus,

10

defendant's only conceivable complaint must go to the amount of restitution. However, as
the Twitchell Court observed, the amount of restitution need not be precisely
proportionate to the damage caused by the defendant when the goal of restitution is, in
part, to rehabilitate the defendant and deter similar conduct. Accordingly, even if
defendant could demonstrate that the trial court's factual findings concerning the amount
of restitution was disproportionate, that alone does not demonstrate an abuse of
discretion.
In support of his argument that the trial court did not establish a causal relationship
between his criminal conduct and the damage to the car, defendant cites State v. Martinez,
2002 UT App 207 (Memorandum Opinion),2 and State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, fl3-5,987 P.2d 1289. However, both cases are distinguishable because the evidence in
those cases failed to show any relationship between the defendants' admitted conduct and
the losses suffered by the victims.
In Martinezj the defendant was accused of welfarefraud,fraudulentlyobtaining
medical benefits and attempting to distribute methamphetamine. Martinez, 2002 UT App
at * 1. The defendant admitted to welfarefraudand attempted distribution of
methamphetamine in exchange for dismissal of the charge of fraudulently obtaining
medical benefits. The trial court, however, imposed restitution based on the defendant's
supposed misrepresentations to her doctor to obtain drugs - allegations to which

2

Pursuant to Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, % 16,444 P.3d. 734, which
allows citation to memorandum opinions, a copy of Martinez is attached as Addendum C.
11

defendant did not admit. Thus, this Court concluded: "It appears that in order to create a
'sufficient nexus/ the court may have considered conduct beyond that which Martinez
admitted." Id. at *2.3
Similarly, in Watson, this Court reversed the restitution order because it bore no
relationship to the conduct the defendant had admitted. There, the defendant was charged
with criminal homicide and attempted criminal homicide because she allegedly drove two
co-defendants to andfromthe crime scene. Watson, 1999 UT App at f 2. The defendant
was also charged with obstruction of justice for selling the car used in the crime. Id. She
pleaded guilty to attempted obstruction of justice and was sentenced to pay restitution to
the Victim's Reparation Fund in connection with the death of the murder victim. Id. This
Court reversed, stating:
To conclude that [defendant] admitted responsibility for the
murder and that there was a sufficient nexus to hold her
accountable to the victim's family for restitution, the trial
court examined and made inferences about Watson's state of
mind based upon the evidence before it However, the statute
is more narrow. It does not ask the trial court to analyze a
defendant's state of mind, but rather asks it to focus on
admissions made to the sentencing court. In other words, the
statute requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be
firmly established, much like a guilty plea, before the court
can order restitution.

Id. at U 5 (emphasis added).

3

Because the rscord in Martinez was so unclear as to exactly what the defendant's
fraudulent activities were, this Court remanded for further findings. Id. at *2.
12

As the Watson court made clear, the nexus requirement does not, as defendant
contends, require a precise causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the
losses to the victim. Rather, it requires that "responsibility for the criminal conduct be
firmly established ..." Id. (emphasis added). When, as is the case here, the defendant
admits to criminal conduct that would allow the victim to recover damages in a civil
action, the trial court has the discretion to impose both compensatory and rehabilitative
restitution. Clearly, the trial court in this case did not abuse the broad discretion granted
by the restitution statute. Accordingly, the restitution order should be affirmed and
defendant's appeal dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
restitution order be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of September, 2002.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution
— Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities* means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facta or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and paymentforexpenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and aa further defined in
Subsection (4Xc).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages aa a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" doaa not include any (^participant in the defendant's
criminal activitiea.
(2) Within the limita preacribad by thia chapter, a court may sentence a
erson convicted of an offense to any ona of the following sentences or
ombination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualificationfrompublic or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) Thia chapter doaa not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property,
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a personfromoffice;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.

(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (lXe).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4X0 and (4Xd).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant ails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department electa to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have die same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount orderedfromthe time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act
(b) (i) If a defendant haa been extradited to thia state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he haa been'
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitutionforcosts expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (8).

d) <i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this»subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re*
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court orderfromone county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor, and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply*.
(i) the defendant it charted with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5XaXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported,
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5XcXi) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime*
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in

the case, :he probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant nets, fai»iiu«wf
(i) the <x»t of the cUuna^ or loss if the ofl^nse resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and device* relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the incooae lost by the victim as a i^ult of tne offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cc«t of naceasary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Kb) and:
(i) theflu—wfoiresources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to befixedby the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.
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Before Judges JACKSON. BILLINGS.
andTHORNE.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
JACKSON. Presiding Judge:
*1 Martinez appeals the trial court's order

requiring her to pay restitution to the
Workers1 Compensation Fund (WCF) in
the amount of $14,647. She challenges the
sentencing court's "interpretation of the
restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-201(4VaViU1999V when it ordered
restitution ... related to criminal conduct
for which [she] was not convicted, did not
plead guilty, and did not admit
responsibility." We remand.JFNil

FN1. In light of this ruling, we
decline to address Martinets
remaining issues.

We apply an abuse of discretion standard
when reviewing an order of restitution. See
State v. Weeks. 2000 UT App 273. f 7. 12
P.3dll0. cert, granted, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah
2001): State v. Dominguez. 1999 UT App
343. f 6. 992 P.2d 99S. However, ff[w]c
review the trial court's interpretation of a
[restitution] statute for correctness and
accord no deference to its conclusions of
law." State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930. 937

Martinez pleaded guilty to Workers'
Compensation Fraud, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-109(2) (1996V which
provides in part:
Any person who has intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly, devised any
scheme or artifice to obtain workers'
compensation insurance coverage,
disability compensation, [or] medical
benefits ... by means of false or

fraudulent pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions, and
who intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly communicates or causes a
communication with another in
furtherance of the scheme or artifice, is
guilty of workers1 compensation
insurance fraud,...
Id. Martinez supplemented her guilty plea
with a statement of her conduct, stating: "I
... obtained workers1 compensation benefits
by working under an assumed name while
r e c e i v i n g benefits
for
being
unemployable." (Emphasis added.)
If Martinez's admitted criminal conduct
resulted in pecuniary damages to WCF,
then the sentencing court correctly applied
section 76-3-20 K4VaVn and correctly
concluded that restitution is appropriate.
See State v. Watson. 1999 UT App 273. Iflf
3-5. 987 P.2d 1289 (per curiam).
Conversely, if Martinez's admitted
criminal conduct bears no relationship to
the damages suffered by WCF, then the
court erroneously imposed restitution. See
id. (requiring that defendant's admitted
criminal conduct bear "sufficient nexus" to
damages suffered by victim before court
may enter restitution order). To determine
whether a "sufficient nexus" exists
between the defendant's admitted conduct
and the claimed pecuniary damages, the
sentencing court must determine that
"liability is ctar aft a matter of law and
[thatl commission of the crime clearly
establishes causality of the mjury or
damages." State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d
979. 983 (Utah Ct.App.l993V
Martinez's statement ambiguously
identifies the conduct that violated the
Workers' Compensation Fraud statute

because she does not state how her work
under an assumed name obtained benefits,
or exactly which benefits she "devised ...
to obtain." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-109(2).
She pleaded guilty to a separate charge of
attempting to distnbutemethamphetamine.
She did not plead guilty to fraudulently
obtaining medical benefits. The record is
unclear whether she was not entitled to
prescription coverage due to her admitted
conduct in working under an assumed
name and attempting to distribute
methamphetamine. It thus remains unclear
whether the court could hold her liable for
restitution. See Robinson. 860 P.2d at 983
(requiring that commission of crime must
"clearly" establish causality of pecuniary
damages suffered by victim); see also
Watson. 1999 UT App at f 5 ("[The
restitution statute] does not ask the trial
court to analyze a defendant's state of
mind, but rather asks it to focus on
admissions made to the sentencing court."
(Emphasis added.)).
*2 Further, the court's statements do not
show us why Martinez's admitted conduct
clearly establishes a nexus with the
pecuniary damages suffered by WCF. It
stated twice that the legal basis of its
restitution order was the "fraudulent
activities" Martinez engaged in. It also
stated there was a nexus because Martinez
"would not have received Oxycontin at all
had she been forthright and had she not
been engaging in fraudulent activities."
The court reiterated that it was
disingenuous for Martinez to expect
payment after she had been deceitful and
dishonest and that Dr. Dall "would not
have prescribed the medication had he
known all the circumstances." However,
the court failed to explain what "fraudulent

activities" it relied upon in imposing
restitution, or how Martinez's statement
admitted those "fraudulent activities."
The restitution order seems to rest on the
assumption that although Martinez was
entitled to some pain medication, she was
not entitled to Oxycontin because of her
"fraudulent activities." Apparently, the
court based its restitution order on
allegations that Martinez somehow fooled
Dr. Dall into prescribing Oxycontin or
excess Oxycontin. However, the State
dropped the charges relating to such
misrepresentation and fraud in exchange
for her guilty plea. It appears that in order
to create a "sufficient nexus," the court
may have considered conduct beyond that
which Martinez admitted.
Accordingly, "we remand this case to the
trial court to conduct a restitution hearing
in conformance with this opinion," State v.
Mast 2001 UT App 402. If 25. 40 P.3d
1143. to identify and explain (1) the nature
and extent of Martinez's admitted conduct,
[FN2] and (2) how that conduct "clearly
establishes causality of the injury or
damages" suffered by WCF. State v.
Robinson. 860 P.2d at 983.

FN2. The sentencing court must
settle this question to satisfy the
first prong of the Robinson test,
which requires that "liability [must
be] clear as a matter of law...."
State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979.
983 0JtahCt.App.l993Y

WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS.
Associate Presiding Judge and WILLIAM

A. THORNE JR.. Judge.
2002 WL 1291960 (Utah App.), 2002 UT
App 207
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